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Under price competition between a domestic and a foreign producer on a domestic
market, an import quota can enforce the equilibrium quality ranking that favours the
domestic producer and thereby increase domestic welfare.
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Several papers in the recent literature on international trade address the impact of trade
policies on quality choice by the 6rms (e.g., Herguera & Lutz [1998], Zhou et al. [2000]).
In particular, Herguera, Kujal & Petrakis [2000] study the impact of quotas on quality
choice within a framework. In their model, quotas that would be ineffective
at the free trade equilibrium in terms of quantity reactions are shown to be effective
through their impact on quality choices. Because of the quota, 6rms tend to downgrade
their qualities for quotas set in the vicinity of the free trade equilibrium.
Yet, the effect of the quota depends on the initial productsC hierarchy which is not
uniquely de6ned on a priori grounds. Indeed, standard duopoly models of vertical dif-
ferentiation display equilibria in pure strategies: one sees the domestic 6rm selling
the high quality product and the other displays the reverse quality ranking. These two
equilibria coexist even under relatively large costs asymmetries. Needless to say, these
two hierarchies are not equivalent from a domestic welfare point of view. Indeed, even
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0.2 Quota, Quality, Prices : a three stage game
Setting a 6nite common upper bound to qualities and consumers reservation price is not a severe limitation
of our model (cf. Boccard & Wauthy [2000]).
if costs are identical (so that equilibrium prices, sales and quality levels are the same in
both equilibria), the domestic welfare is larger if the domestic producer sells the high
quality good, simply because the high quality 6rm is the high pro6t 6rm (cf. Lehmann-
Grube [1997]). In this respect, a trade policy whose main effect would be to select the
domestic 6rm as the unique possible quality leader in equilibrium seems particularly de-
sirable. Such a policy could be viewed as inducing by removing from the
set of possible equilibrium outcomes the con6guration where the foreign 6rm acts as a
quality leader.
We show in this brief note that under price competition, the imposition of a quota
has precisely this virtue. The strategic effect we underline here is in line with empirical
papers such as those of Aw & Roberts [1986] on shoes and Feenstra [1988] on automobiles
where such quality upgrading have been reported for the US market. Last, it is worth
stressing that the level of the quota that is required to ensure these outcomes is to be
set at a fair level, i.e. an apparently not too restrictive level.
In the sequel we establish this result with the help of a simple stage game where 6rms
choose quality and price after the government has chosen the level of the quota.
ConsumersC preferences are set according to the standard framework we use in our com-
panion paper Boccard & Wauthy [2000] (hereafter BW). A domestic 6rm competes
with a foreign one on the domestic market. The good with label has a quality
index Consumers exhibit unit demand for the good and are characterized by
a Itaste for qualityJ , is uniformly distributed in . The indirect utility function
is for . Not consuming yields a utility normalized to .
We consider a three-stage game : the domestic government chooses a quota then
in the subgame 6rms choose quality levels at a cost . The
latter can be interpreted as the R&D investment that is required to yield the desired
quality. In the last stage, a subgame 6rms compete in prices and .
In the present note, we retain the assumption made by Berry, Levinshon & Pakes
[2000] for modelling the implementation of a quota: the foreign 6rm may sell in excess
of the quota but a penalty is levied on these extra sales. We assume w.l.o.g. that
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0.3 The Free Trade Benchmark
The apparent penalty is around of the price which is lower than our choice but we have to include
the reputation effect for the 6rm if its sales exceed the quota and is prosecuted by the goverment.
We follow in this respect the de6nition of Bertrand competition suggested by Vives [2000] in his recent
book. This assumption is best view as a black-box for complex reputation effects not modeled here. We
perform the analysis for case of rationing in a much more complex article : Boccard & Wauthy [1999].
If , one 6rm chooses a high quality, increasing in but less than the upper bound. The other 6rm
differentiates with a lower quality. Since analytic solutions are more complex to use we focus on
the marginal cost of production is zero for both 6rms and for simplicity that to
guarantee that it is never pro6table for the foreign 6rm to produce beyond the quota.
Hence in equilibrium the foreign 6rm respects the quota. Furthermore, 6rms produce to
satisfy demand. In other words, we assume that the foreign 6rm cannot turn consumers
away if prices are such that her demand exceeds the quota level. The fact that
takes place in this market considerably eases the formal analysis of the capacity game.
Let us 6rst recall of the equilibrium analysis under free trade ( ) done in BW. Note
that no 6rm would choose a quality identical to that of her opponent since this would
yield the standard zero-pro6t Bertrand equilibrium in the price subgame. When the
cost of choosing a positive quality is small ( large) the incentives to differentiate are
exclusively related to the price competition mechanism: one 6rm chooses the maximal
quality while the other accommodates with a lower quality . The ratio of differ-
entiation decreases slowly towards as quality costs become negligible ( ) while
in equilibrium, sales converge to of the market for the low quality 6rm and of
the market size for the high quality 6rm.
This quality-price game is similar to the Jbattle of the sexesJ game where one player
chooses his most preferred action, the high quality while the other accommodates with
a lower quality. Which of the two players manages to achieve his preferred action is
indeterminate, hence the existence of two subgame perfect equilibria. Since they only
differ by the identity of the high quality 6rm, it should be clear domestic welfare is
strictly larger when the domestic 6rm is the quality leader because it makes higher pro6ts.
The following proposition states that it is always possible to enforce this equilibrium by
choosing adequately the level of the quota.
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0.4 The Price Equilibrium
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We rely on the fact that a quota in a pricing game is formally equivalent to a capacity
constraint and use the analysis of BW where 6rms choose capacity levels before competing
in prices. The capacity constrained pricing game is denoted where is
the capacity level of 6rm . We now recall a brief characterization of the equilibria
that may obtain in such pricing games, starting with the con6gurations where productsC
qualities differ.
Under product differentiation, demands as a function of prices are de6ned by
and . There exists a unique price equilibrium whose fea-
tures depend on the particular capacity-quality constellation we are considering.
Region applies in the domain where capacities are large enough for both 6rms
to allow for the standard (i.e. unconstrained) Nash equilibrium. In region the low
quality 6rm sells its capacity in equilibrium, while the low quality 6rm enjoys a large
enough capacity. In region the contrary applies. Last, in region , both 6rms
capacities are low, so that both 6rms are constrained in equilibrium.
Whenever products are homogeneous, capacity constrained price competition under
a no-rationing assumption yields a multiplicity of equilibria. The intuition for this result
is as follows. Assume two 6rms face identical capacities and compete in price under our
(Bertrand) no rationing assumption. If 6rm names then, by naming
6rm captures no consumers (but inLicts losses to 6rm which is forced to meet
full demand, thereby selling beyond capacity). By naming 6rm captures all
consumers, and is forced to serve all of them, thereby selling at loss beyond its capacity.
In other words, because 6rm is limited in capacity but nevertheless forced to meet full
demand, undercutting the otherCs price may not be an attractive strategy.
The natural candidate best reply in the present case is thus to the otherCs
price. Since this argument is independent of , a multiplicity of equilibria appears.
Note also that in such equilibria, both 6rms enjoy strictly positive pro6ts even though
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Similar qualititative results hold when . The proofs for this case are available upon request from the
corresponding author.
Given the cost for quality , there exists a critical quota level
such that for the domestic rm is the quality leader in the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium of .
Proof
products are homogeneous. In case 6rmsC capacities are highly asymmetric, there still
exists a multiplicity of (asymmetric) equilibria where only the large capacity 6rm enjoys
positive pro6ts. The intuition here is that there exists a range of price which are such that
even matching the otherCs price is costly for the low capacity 6rm, while undercutting is
attractive for the high capacity one.
Analyzing pricing games in the presence of a quota amounts to consider a particular class
of the capacity-constrained pricing games described above. More speci6cally, we consider
and , i.e. 6rm the domestic 6rm, is never constrained (since the quota
does not constrain domestic sales) while the foreign 6rm is constrained at the level of the
quota
In order to study the impact of the quota on 6rmsC quality choices, we need to study
the payoffs accruing to the 6rms, using the relevant equilibrium prices as de6ned by the
previous equations. We will focus here on the case where quality cost is small .
Recall that in order to prove our proposition it is sufficient to identify such that
is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of for .
First we study the quality choices in the case where and identify a
lower bound on such that is indeed a feasible equilibrium. Second we
study the quality game where and show that, irrespective of the quota level,
the foreign 6rm always wants to maximize its own quality under this hierarchy. The
best reply of the domestic 6rm in domain is then to differentiate (but less than
in the standard case). Third, we consider the case where the domestic 6rm matches
the foreign quality ( ) . This case is relevant here because the domestic 6rm can
secure positive pro6ts in the pricing game even when products are homogeneous. We
identify the critical level of the quota for which the domestic 6rm is indifferent between
this imitation and differentiation. This level precisely de6nes since for any smaller
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Case i) The domestic rm has a strictly higher quality
Case ii) The foreign rm has a strictly higher quality
case
i)
Case iii) Homogeneous products
quota, the best reply of the domestic 6rm is to match the foreign quality, so that, in
the face of this threat, the best reply of the foreign 6rm is to differentiate with a lower
quality.
As we can set and observe that and
to conclude that the relevant price equilibrium is either in or depending on the
quality choice made by the 6rms. Note 6rst that the quota is effective if
(region ). This is always satis6ed for but never if as . Hence
if the government chooses the price equilibrium is in region . The equilibrium
qualities under this particular hierarchy are therefore the standard ones: and
. The choice of is obviously sufficient to ensure that and is
feasible as part of a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Consider now the alternative hierarchy. Observe that . The
price equilibrium is in area if (this is always true if )
and in region otherwise. In the latter region, the analysis is similar to that of
up to the 6rmCs indices. We obtain and The foreign 6rm sales in this
equilibrium candidate are , which is also the lower limit of the quota for this price
equilibrium to apply.
Consider then the case of a more restrictive quota. Region applies and pro6ts
are and Note that and
in the relevant domain. This is sufficient to prove that the
optimal choice of the foreign 6rm is the best available quality, irrespective of the quota
level. As the best reply of the domestic 6rm is The condition
for being in area is
Because price competition is mitigated by the presence of the quota, it is necessary to
consider the possibility that 6rms choose identical products. Under Bertrand competi-
tion, i.e. when the foreign 6rm must meet demand in any case and incur the penalty
if selling beyond the quota, we can derive from BW that under the set of
equilibria is any in and any ; it yields nil pro6ts for the foreign
6rm. The only stable equilibrium from this correspondence is the Pareto dominating one
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yielding pro6t .
It is a matter of computations to show that for
large. This in turn means that the domestic 6rm always prefers imitation to optimal
differentiation. Given that the domestic 6rm will choose it is optimal now
for the foreign to differentiate to Case therefore applies and leads to 6nal
equilibrium choices and We have thus shown that More
generally, the critical level ensuring this result is ; it is plotted
on Figure 1 below for (small quality cost).
Let us summarize the argument behind our Proposition. The presence of the quota
does not directly alters the willingness of the foreign 6rm to be the quality leader. Indeed,
irrespective of the quota level, and whatever the quality level of the domestic 6rm, it
remains true that in case he is the quality leader, the foreigner tends to choose the
best available quality. However, the presence of the quota allows the domestic 6rm to
be more aggressive at the quality stage. Indeed, the threat of matching foreign quality
is a credible threat in the presence of a quota. This quota ensures indeed the domestic
6rm a positive pro6t, even if products are homogeneous at the price competition stage.
Facing this threat, the foreign 6rm is better off accommodating in quality by optimally
downgrading. It is therefore sufficient for the government to impose a quota at, or
below, the level that makes the Jquality matchingJ threat credible as a domestic best
reply. It is noteworthy that the corresponding level of the quota is not highly restrictive.
In particular, it is not binding in equilibrium.
Quality leapfrogging takes place here by enforcing domestic quality leadership as the
unique equilibrium outcome. The reason why the quota selects the desirable equilibrium
7
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